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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern American marketplace provides many income opportunities, 
not only to those with golden eggs, but to those with golden sperm as well. The 
U.S. market for gametes is robust, international, and growing, thanks to 
advances in fertility treatments; new sources of demand that include older, 
single, and gay and lesbian parents; and overseas regulatory changes that have 
prompted gamete shortages and a thriving export market.1 Data suggest that in 
2006 alone nearly 55,000 children in the United States were born through 
assisted reproduction, more than 7500 of whom were created through the use of 
“donated” eggs.2 Although figures on the number of children born through the 
use of commercially purchased sperm are more variable, reports suggest that 
the number may be nearly as high, and perhaps higher, than the number born 
through the use of commercially purchased oocytes.3 
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 1. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV 203 (2008) (discussing modern growth in various reproductive markets). 
 2. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2006 ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 13, 56–59 (Nov. 2008) (providing data on assisted 
reproductive technology (ART) births and ART births using donor eggs). 
 3. The traditional secrecy and lack of reporting requirements regarding births from sperm 
donation result in highly variable estimates. For example, although a 1988 Congressional Report puts 
the number at 30,000 births per year, other estimates are as low as 4000 to 5000 births per year. 
Compare OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY—BACKGROUND PAPER 3 (1988) (“The survey 
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Yet these superficially similar markets have developed in divergent ways, 
and, as a result, both suppliers and consumers face drastically different 
commercial environments in the sperm and egg markets. Only some of these 
distinctions can be attributed to differences in the type of genetic material 
donated or to dissimilarities necessitated by the gamete-collection process. 
Although the commercial disparities between the egg and sperm markets 
are numerous, ranging from divergent recruiting and advertising techniques to 
differences in the donor attributes valued by consumers, the most drastic 
difference between the two markets relates to open, anticompetitive attempts 
by the fertility industry to depress the price of eggs. This characteristic of the 
egg market is not observed in the sperm market and so far has occurred without 
regulatory notice, public outcry, or legal consequence. 
This naked price-fixing of egg donor compensation is so unusual in the 
modern U.S. regulatory environment of unrestrained competition that the most 
intriguing question it raises is not whether it violates the Sherman Act—under 
existing precedent it does. Rather, the relevant question is how, given the 
government’s substantial enforcement resources and the presence of an active 
and entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ bar, this buyers’ cartel has managed to survive 
unchallenged since at least 2000. One is tempted to assert that the twenty-dollar 
bill cannot be real, given that it is still lying on the sidewalk. 
The money is real. Its presence, however, may be obscured by the persistent 
dialogue of gift-giving and altruistic donation that masks both the highly 
commercial nature of egg “donation” and the benefits to the fertility industry of 
controlling the price of eggs, which are a necessary input into many fertility 
services. As a consequence, the fertility industry has managed to openly engage 
in anticompetitive attempts to depress egg prices, a feat facilitated by romantic 
presumptions that the fertility trade differs from other markets because its work 
is virtuous, and that egg donors are engaged in a form of philanthropy that 
distinguishes them from suppliers in other industries. 
This realization also has the potential to complicate an otherwise 
straightforward antitrust analysis. As illustrated by United States v. Brown 
University, 4  courts are sometimes willing to entertain strained market 
justifications for collusive restraints on competition when the incentive to 
collude is not immediately obvious and those restraints are defended by public-
 
estimates that 172,000 women underwent artificial insemination in 1986–87, at an average cost of $953, 
resulting in 35,000 births from artificial insemination by husband (AIH), and 30,000 births from 
artificial insemination by donor (AID).”), with Cryogenetic Labs. Inc., Children by Donor 
Insemination, http://www.cryolab.com/Default.aspx?section=postconceptionservices&page=donorOff 
spring (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (“We estimate that now about 4,000 to 5,000 children a year are born 
in the US as the result of anonymous donor insemination.”). It is doubtful that these reported 
differences are attributable solely to reduced demand over time. Although medical advances that 
address male infertility have reduced demand for donor sperm among heterosexual couples over the 
past decade, demand from single and lesbian women and from overseas has increased. See Krawiec, 
supra note 1, at 216–19 (discussing the shifting demand for donor sperm over time and across 
populations). 
 4. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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policy rationales that we hold dear as a society.5 And although the oocyte-
buying agreement can be distinguished from Brown and other relevant 
precedent by the absence of plausible procompetitive justifications,6 the egg 
market surely meets the threshold for cases loaded with emotional content, 
touching broad-based societal nerves about reproduction, gender, bodily 
commodification, and the role of markets. 
To illustrate the extent to which public-interest rhetoric enables private 
wealth transfers in the egg market (and to illuminate why such rhetoric is so 
effective, playing on deeply held societal norms), this article compares the egg 
market to its closest cousin—the sperm market. In contrast to the egg market, 
the sperm market is not characterized by collusive attempts to control prices. 
Instead, as in most other industries, sperm prices are established by the 
economic forces of supply and demand. 
As elaborated in this article, simple economics and biological differences 
between the sexes that dictate different collection and matching procedures for 
egg and sperm may contribute to the absence of price-fixing in the sperm 
market. Economics and biology aside, however, a comparison of the egg market 
to the sperm market also reveals deeper social norms at work that may 
contribute both to the different approaches to competition and compensation in 
the egg and sperm markets and to a societal disregard for collusive, 
anticompetitive behavior that would be unacceptable (indeed, per se illegal) in 
other industries.7 Those norms include gendered notions regarding women’s 
altruistic nature and their role in the marketplace—particularly in sacred areas, 
such as reproduction—as well as widely held beliefs that egg markets tread 
dangerously close to baby and organ markets in ways that sperm markets do 
not. 
Importantly, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, there is a 
clear societal and industry consensus that egg donors are—and should be—
motivated primarily by altruism and the desire to help the infertile, rather than 
by the desire for monetary compensation. This presumption is highlighted by 
 
 5. See id. at 672 (“This alleged pure altruistic motive [equality of educational access] and alleged 
absence of a revenue maximizing purpose contribute to our uncertainty with regard to Overlap’s anti-
competitiveness, and thus prompts us to give careful scrutiny to the nature of Overlap, and to refrain 
from declaring Overlap per se unreasonable.”); see also infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text 
(discussing Brown in more detail). Variations on this theme have been raised by some observers 
troubled by recent unsuccessful Clayton Act challenges to nonprofit-hospital mergers. See Barak D. 
Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 123 
(2007) (citing a variety of rationales that have been proffered to explain courts’ hands-off approach to 
such mergers, including that “courts do not want competition in the health care sector and prefer 
instead to entrust benevolent monopolists to act in the community’s best interests,” and a judicial 
conviction that nonprofits do not have the same incentives to raise prices as do for-profits, but 
concluding that the better explanation is that courts fail to understand the market structure of the 
health-care industry and its effect on competition). 
 6. See infra notes 144–48 and accompanying text (distinguishing the oocyte-pricing guidelines 
based on this factor and others). 
 7. See infra V.B (discussing the rule of per se illegality normally applied to naked, horizontal 
price-fixing agreements). 
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egg donor recruitment materials urging “sunny Samaritans” to “give the gift of 
life,” by donor-agency and fertility-center screening and other practices, and by 
consumer purchasing behavior.8 Ironically, the true limit to women’s altruistic 
nature is starkly revealed by the experience of the stem-cell industry and by 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada, that have banned 
compensated egg donation and subsequently encountered a lack of donors and 
severe egg shortages.9 
In contrast, the insistence that sperm donors are motivated primarily by a 
desire for monetary compensation is so strong that potential donors expressing 
altruistic motivations are viewed with suspicion and presumed to harbor an 
egomaniacal desire to propagate. In contrast to the gift-giving rhetoric 
characteristic of egg donor recruitment materials, prospective sperm donors are 
attracted through materials that ask, “Why not get paid for it?” and advertise 
that “[y]our sperm can earn!”10 
Gender-based marketing, of course, is neither new nor limited to the 
reproductive industry. Moreover, in some instances (including the market for 
gametes) these gender-based market constructions may enable the flourishing 
of industries that otherwise would stagnate. By reframing traditionally 
unacceptable behavior as a more palatable and familiar transaction, both 
producers and consumers may be enticed into a market that is otherwise 
socially problematic or even repulsive.11 In the gamete market, this reframing 
frequently takes the form of repackaging socially questionable practices—the 
sale of motherhood, in the case of egg markets, and masturbation and an 
evolutionary desire to spread male genes, in the case of sperm markets—into 
ones that more closely resemble comfortable social stereotypes regarding male 
and female roles in reproduction and in markets. 
Absent a significant shift in the societal conception of motherhood, 
therefore, it may be the case that appeals to altruistic impulses will always play 
a vital role in the manner by which egg donors are solicited and packaged to 
consumers. At the same time, the continued insistence that egg donors are, and 
should be, motivated primarily by altruism is problematic on various levels. As 
many scholars have argued, the insistent demand that much valuable female 
 
 8. See infra II.C (discussing egg donor recruiting). 
 9. See infra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing oocyte shortages in other countries caused 
by various legal restrictions); infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the shortage of oocytes 
for stem-cell research). 
 10. See, e.g., DAVID PLOTZ, THE GENIUS FACTORY: THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF THE NOBEL 
PRIZE SPERM BANK 155 (2005) (free pens imprinted, “Why not get paid for it?”); Posting to Craig’s 
List, San Francisco, http://sfbay.craigslist.org/sfc/etc/1119949773.html (“Your sperm can earn!”); see 
infra III.C (discussing sperm donor motivations and recruitment). 
 11. Cf. Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions that 
Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCH. 255, 286–94 (1997) (discussing the readiness with 
which some research subjects will consider taboo trade-offs when given rationalizing additional facts to 
consider); Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 37 (2007) (urging 
organ-matching programs as a means to reduce organ shortages without triggering the repugnance 
prompted by direct financial incentives). 
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labor should spring from altruistic motives threatens to reinforce gendered 
notions that the market activities of women are driven in large part by altruism 
and that women as a group are uninterested in reaping the full gains of trade 
from the provision of their goods and services.12 Importantly for this article, 
however, this persistent dialogue of gift-giving and altruistic donation may 
obscure the highly commercial nature of egg “donation” and the benefits to the 
fertility industry of controlling egg prices, enabling anticompetitive behavior 
that otherwise would not pass muster. As a result, the twenty-dollar bill remains 
on the sidewalk, untouched. 
Section II of this article provides an overview of the oocyte business, 
highlighting issues relating to recruitment, compensation, controversy, retrieval, 
and risk. Section III does the same for the sperm business. Sections IV and V, 
respectively, discuss anticompetitive behavior in the egg market and argue that 
the horizontal price-fixing embodied in the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine’s (ASRM)13 pricing guidelines violates the Sherman Act. Section VI 
concludes that market forces, rather than collusive industry agreement, must be 
allowed to determine the proper mix of altruism (if any) and monetary payment 
that ultimately constitutes total egg donor compensation. 
II 
EGG MARKETS: GIVING THE GIFT OF LIFE 
A. Recruitment, Retrieval, Risks 
The phrase “egg donation” is largely a misnomer in the United States, 
where nearly all oocytes from unrelated donors are procured through payment. 
Oocytes are typically obtained through one of four sources: (1) an egg supplier 
donating for the benefit of a close friend or family member;14 (2) the fertility 
 
 12. See Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1129, 1143 (2005) (“Much of what 
women have market power over, such as their . . . reproductive services, they have long been expected 
not to commodify at all. Even when monetary compensation is allowed, it is often kept low and female 
providers are expected to be interested in rewards other than money.”); Krawiec, supra note 1 (arguing 
that classifying profit-seeking as an improper or, at best, secondary motivation in the context of the 
provision of reproductive goods and services reinforces gendered notions regarding the proper role of 
women in reproduction and in markets, and may subtly reduce their economic bargaining power); Julia 
D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 188 (2000) (“[T]he implication that 
young women should desire to undergo a series of highly uncomfortable procedures that pose both 
short term and long term risks to their physical well-being for which they will not collect the market 
clearing price threatens to reinforce stereotypes of females as generous rather than self-interested.”). 
 13. “[ASRM] is a multidisciplinary organization dedicated to the advancement of the art, science, 
and practice of reproductive medicine. ASRM accomplishes its mission through the pursuit of 
excellence in education and research and through advocacy on behalf of patients, physicians, and 
affiliated health care providers.” ASRM Mission Statement, http://www.asrm.org/mission.html (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
 14. Although eggs from friends or family members may be free, they are often unavailable or 
undesirable. For example, if hereditary illness is the reason a prospective parent seeks egg donation in 
the first place, then a related-party donor might be unacceptable. Moreover, a genetic mother with 
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clinic’s paid-donor recruitment program; (3) the fertility clinic, purchasing 
through an egg donor agency that recruits through a paid donation program; 
and (4) a paid egg supplier recruited directly by the consumer, either 
independently or through a broker, agent, or other intermediary.15 
Research indicates that egg donors are demographically similar to sperm 
donors in terms of age (young), race (white), and marital status (single), but egg 
donors have lower levels of education and socioeconomic status than do sperm 
donors, and are more likely to have children of their own.16 In addition, 
although both egg donors and sperm donors report a mix of altruistic and profit 
motivations for the decision to donate, sperm donors are significantly more 
likely to report solely or primarily profit motives, whereas egg donors are more 
likely to report solely or primarily altruistic motives.17 As elaborated in section 
II.C., however, there are reasons to view such reported differences with 
suspicion: egg donors, but not sperm donors, are recruited with materials that 
highlight the ability to help others, rather than the ability to earn money; egg 
donors reporting primarily financial motivations for the decision to donate are 
excluded from consideration as donors; and donor-agency staff frequently 
coach egg donors, but not sperm donors, on the need to express altruistic 
motives for the donation in order to appeal to prospective purchasers.18 
Egg donation is a time-consuming process that carries some health risks. 
Donors typically must be between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five.19 All 
potential egg donors undergo a comprehensive medical and psychological 
screening process before acceptance into a donor program. The screening 
includes general physical and gynecological exams, a psychological evaluation, 
blood and urine tests, and medical and family histories.20 
Any number of factors discovered during the screening may be 
disqualifying, including information gleaned from genetic- or infectious-disease 
 
whom the child and parents have continuing contact risks future complications. Kenneth Baum, Golden 
Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 116. 
 15. Sharon N. Covington & William E. Gibbons, What is Happening to the Price of Eggs?, 87 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1001, 1002 (2007). This fourth category generates the most controversy and 
media attention, because the offer prices tend to be higher than average, and the purchaser frequently 
seeks a donor with quite specific characteristics, such as a particular ethnic background; GPA or SAT 
scores in a certain range; or specified aptitudes, such as musical or athletic ability. See infra note 31 
(discussing such advertising and purchases in more detail). 
 16. L.R. Shover et. al., The Personality and Motivation of Semen Donors: A Comparison with 
Oocyte Donors, 7 HUM. REPROD. 575, 575–76 (studying a sample of egg and sperm donors and finding 
a median age of 28.7 for egg donors—compared to 28.5 for the sperm donors—and that 89% of egg 
donors are white, 44% are married, and 58% have one or more children). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See infra II.C. 
 19. ADVISORY GROUP ON ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS., N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE 
LAW, THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG DONOR? 5 (2009), available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/ 
community/reproductive_health/infertility/docs/1127.pdf. The lower limit is designed to ensure legal 
capacity, whereas the upper limit is designed to maximize the response to fertility drugs and to reduce 
the chances of birth defects. Id. 
 20. Id. at 6. 
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tests; risks revealed by the family or medical histories; a history of smoking, 
drug, or alcohol abuse; current or past use of certain prescription drugs; and 
many other factors.21 Approximately ninety percent of prospective donors are 
rejected or withdraw from the process prior to donation.22 Once accepted, the 
donor’s profile is added to the center’s database to be considered for selection 
by recipients. In contrast to the sperm donation process, egg extraction will not 
occur unless a particular recipient selects the donor.23 
Once matched with a recipient, the egg donor undergoes a three-week 
course of hormone injections to induce ovulation, during which time the donor 
cannot have unprotected sex, smoke, use illegal drugs, or drink alcohol, and can 
take prescription and over-the-counter drugs only with permission.24 During this 
time, frequent doctor visits are required to monitor the donor’s hormone levels 
through drug tests and her ovaries through ultrasound.25 The long-term risks of 
fertility treatment are unknown, but may include an increased risk of some 
types of cancer.26  Although the short-term risks of fertility treatment are 
normally limited to mood swings, fluid retention, and enlarged ovaries, 
hormone therapy can cause Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome (OHSS), 
which in its severe form can cause serious medical complications, including 
blood clots, kidney failure, fluid build-up in the lungs, and shock. Rarely, the 
condition can be life-threatening and require hospitalization and the removal of 
one or both ovaries.27 
When the eggs are ready for retrieval, they are removed through an 
outpatient surgical procedure that can cause bleeding and infection. In rare 
cases, the bladder, bowel, or nearby blood vessels may be punctured during 
retrieval, causing severe internal bleeding and necessitating major abdominal 
surgery.28 
B. Compensation and Controversy 
Although these more-serious risks of egg donation are quite rare (only one 
to two percent of egg donors require hospitalization during the process),29 it is 
easy to understand why few women would undergo the process for a stranger 
 
 21. Id. at 8. 
 22. Stephanie Smith, Dim Economy Drives Women to Donate Eggs for Profit, CNN, Aug. 8, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/08/05/selling.eggs/index.html#cnnSTCText. 
 23. Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the Medical 
Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 319, 329 (2007). 
 24. ADVISORY GROUP ON ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS., supra note 19, at 18. 
 25. Id. at 8. 
 26. Although some studies document a link between hormone therapy and ovarian cancer, others 
do not. Id. at 16; see also Helen Pearson, Health Effects of Egg Donation May Take Decades to Emerge, 
442 NATURE 607–08 (2006) (discussing this debate and current research). 
 27. See ADVISORY GROUP ON ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS., supra note 19, at 15. 
 28. Id. at 17. 
 29. Almeling, supra note 23, at 320 (reporting an ASRM estimate of egg donor hospitalization 
rates). 
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without the inducement of substantial financial compensation. This intuition is 
borne out by the experiences of the stem-cell industry and of other countries, 
such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada, that have banned 
compensation for egg donation and subsequently have faced severe egg 
shortages, generating a growing reproductive-tourism trade in the United 
States.30 
Although egg donor compensation in the United States varies widely, with 
prices as low as $1500 and as high as $150,000 reported,31 surveys of fertility 
clinics and donor agencies listed with the Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (SART)32 report average compensation rates per donation cycle of 
$4217 and $5200, respectively.33 These self-reported numbers, while the most 
reliable pricing data available, must nonetheless be approached with caution. 
As elaborated below, SART threatens de-listing for any clinics or agencies that 
fail to comply with ASRM payment guidelines, which specify a maximum 
payment per donation cycle of $5000.34 SART-member clinics and affiliated 
agencies thus have an incentive to report (even anonymously) pricing data that 
 
 30. See infra note 66 (discussing a shortage of eggs for stem-cell research prompted by state 
legislative bans on oocyte compensation). Overseas demand now accounts for thirty percent of all U.S. 
egg donations. Jim Hopkins, Egg Donor Business Booms on Campuses, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 2006, at 
1A (discussing the impact in the United States of Canada’s 2004 ban on paid egg donation); see also 
Gina Kolata, Price of Donor Eggs Soars, Setting Off a Debate on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at 
A1 (discussing couples in Japan who pay a premium to egg donors of Japanese descent in the United 
States because the Japanese ban on paid egg donation has severely reduced supply); American 
RadioWorks: The Fertility Race (Part 8), No Money for Eggs (American Public Media radio broadcast), 
available at http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/fertility_race/part8/ (discussing the egg 
shortage created by the U.K. ban on paid donations, and the resulting imports from the United States). 
 31. The high price was reportedly received through an Internet auction site, launched by a former 
fashion photographer, through which couples can bid for the eggs and sperm of fashion models. The 
site claims sales of $39.2 million through 2004. See Ron’s Angels, http://www.ronsangels.com/ (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2009); see also Carey Goldberg, On Web, Models Auction Their Eggs to Bidders for 
Beautiful Children, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1999, at A11 (reporting that the site auctioned eggs for as 
much as $150,000). Aggressive advertising in college newspapers and on-campus flyers—particularly at 
Ivy League schools—offering prices as high as $50,000 have also generated controversy. See, e.g., Annie 
M. Lowrey, Will You Be My Baby’s Mama?, HARV. CRIMSON, Apr. 29, 2004 (discussing ads for egg 
donation in The Harvard Crimson and other Ivy League college newspapers); Ken Schwartz, Ivy Eggs, 
BUSINESS TODAY, Aug. 5, 2006 (discussing ads for egg and sperm donors in campus newspapers at 
Princeton and other Ivy League schools); Bioethics.net, http://bioethics.net/blog/images/donor.jpg (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2009) (photograph of a flyer posted on the campus of the University of Pennsylvania 
offering $15,000 to $25,000 for a fun, attractive donor meeting certain height and ethnicity 
requirements). Whether fees in this range are common or outliers remains unclear. 
 32. “[SART] is the primary organization of professionals dedicated to the practice of assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) in the United States. . . . The mission of our organization is to set and 
help maintain the standards for ART in an effort to better serve our members and our patients.” SART 
Homepage, http://www.sart.org/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
 33. Covington & Gibbons, supra note 15, at 1002–03 (reporting averages from a survey of SART-
affiliated clinics, and from agency Web sites that are registered with SART). 
 34. See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
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falls within the range specified by the ASRM ethical guidelines. These numbers 
may, therefore, understate the true national average.35 
Nonetheless, taking these self-reported numbers as the best (though 
imperfect) estimate of prevailing egg prices suggests some successful price 
suppression in the egg market. If, as reported by one estimate, egg donors 
spend fifty-six hours in a medical setting during the average donation cycle,36 
this results in an average hourly compensation of between roughly $75 and $93 
for time spent in a medical setting, about the same as hourly sperm donor 
rates.37 As is evident from the above discussion, however, egg donors—unlike 
sperm donors—experience pain, discomfort, and inconvenience outside of the 
time spent in a medical setting due to the effects of hormone therapy. If these 
self-reported numbers accurately reflect average egg donor compensation, then 
egg donors earn less per hour than do sperm donors, despite the health risks 
associated with egg donation.38 
C. Donor Motives 
In the United States, egg donation and related compensation issues have 
generated far more controversy than sperm donation. Although the larger per-
transaction sums and greater price differentiation in the egg market probably 
contribute to this dichotomy, it is likely that presumptions regarding the 
differing motivations of women and men engaged in reproductive activity on 
behalf of others significantly affect such discussions as well. In contrast to sperm 
donors, who are assumed to be motivated primarily—if not solely—by money, 
there is a clear consensus that egg donors are, and should be, motivated 
primarily by altruism. This consensus is demonstrated by egg donor recruitment 
materials, which nearly always reference altruistic motivations and the ability to 
help an infertile couple, for example, by exhorting “sunny Samaritans” to “give 
the gift of life.”39 It is also demonstrated by fertility-center and donor-agency 
screening practices that eliminate as unacceptable potential egg donors who 
 
 35. Consistent with this theory, systematic study of college newspaper ads suggests that the average 
egg donor compensation offered in that setting is over $9000. Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, 
Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oocyte Donors 7 (2009) (unpublished draft, on file with 
author). 
 36. Machelle M. Seibel & Ann Kiessling, Compensating Egg Donors: Equal Pay for Equal Time?, 
328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 737 (1993); Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial 
Compensation of Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 308 (2007). 
 37. See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text (discussing sperm donor compensation rates). 
 38. In section VI below, I relax the assumption of successful price suppression and consider an 
alternate motivation for attempted price collusion in the egg market—the desire to avoid public 
controversy that may trigger more rigorous state or federal oversight of the fertility industry. 
 39. See Joseph Berger, Our Towns; Yale Gene Pool Seen as Route to Better Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
10, 1999, at A19 (referencing an ad in The Yale Daily News that read “Desperately Seeking Smart, 
Sensitive, Sunny Samaritan”); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 1 (discussing ads that urge prospective egg 
donors to “give the gift of life”); Cornell Egg Donor Home, http://www.eggdonorcornell.com (“You 
[prospective egg donors] can literally give the gift of life! In addition, you can be compensated $8,000 
for your time and effort and receive a free medical screening.”) (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
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claim monetary compensation as the overriding motivation for egg donation.40 
Indeed, donor-agency staff express disgust and revulsion toward egg donors 
“just in it for the money” or “trying to make a career” out of egg donation.41 
At some level, this insistence on the altruistic motives of egg donors is 
driven by customer demand: donor-agency staff believe that fertility customers 
do not want egg donors who reveal monetary motivations for the desire to 
donate,42 and sociological research has shown that donor-agency staff spend 
significant amounts of time coaching egg donors, but not sperm donors, on how 
to appropriately package their personalities and their reasons for wanting to 
become a donor.43 That package includes a desire to help those who are infertile 
and downplays profit motivations. 
III 
SPERM MARKETS: “YOUR SPERM CAN EARN!”44 
A. Recruitment, Retrieval, Risks 
Sperm donation is a physically riskless endeavor that requires a relatively 
small time commitment once a donor is accepted into a program. Like egg 
donors, however, sperm donor behavior is constrained during the donation 
period, and this donation period is longer for sperm donors than for egg donors. 
In addition, sperm donors may face higher social costs than do egg donors. 
Historically, for example, sperm donation was associated by some critics 
(particularly the church) with deviant behavior, and there appears to be some 
lingering skepticism concerning sperm donor motivations.45 
 
 40. For example, the Web site of Elite Fertility Solutions states,  
If financial gain is your main motivating factor, then you may not be eligible for the program. 
EFS does not compensate the donor for her eggs. However, we do compensate you for your 
time, commitment and effort. We are interested in candidates whose primary motivation is to 
help a couple achieve their dream of having a child. Egg donor compensation is $5000.00.  
Elite Fertility Solutions, http://www.elitefertility.com/egg_donor_faq.html#HMMCIM (last visited Sept. 
30, 2008). The Web sites of other egg donation programs contain similar statements. See, e.g., 
ConceiveAbilities, http://www.conceiveabilities.com/donor_pg_4a.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) 
(“[W]e strongly advise any potential egg donor not to apply if compensation is the only motivation.”); 
Fertility Alternatives, Inc., Information for Potential Egg Donors, http://www.fertilityalternatives.com/ 
files/eggdonorinfo.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (“Candidates understand there is compensation for 
their time and efforts as a donor[;] however[,] it is not their primary motivation. It is very important 
that you choose to be a donor for altruistic reasons in addition to the financial compensation.”). 
 41. Almeling, supra note 23, at 333–34. 
 42. As one egg donor agency director stated, “‘[Customers] want to know that the person donating 
is a good person. They want to know that person wasn’t doing it for the money.’” Id. at 327. 
 43. Id. at 329–30. 
 44. Posting to Craig’s List, supra note 10. 
 45. See, e.g., Erica Haimes, Issues of Gender in Gamete Donation, 36 SOC. SCI. MED. 85, 87 (1993) 
(reporting that the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission in 1948 urged the criminalization of sperm 
donation because the process requires masturbation and results in the birth of an illegitimate child); 
John McMillan, The Return of the Inseminator: Eutelegenesis in Past and Contemporary Reproductive 
Ethics, 38 STUD. HIST. PHILOS. BIOL. BIOMED. SCI. 393 (2007) (calling the 1948 report’s position that 
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As is the case with egg donation, sperm donors are screened fairly 
rigorously before being accepted into a program, and more than ninety percent 
are either rejected or withdraw from the process at an early stage.46 Although 
the specific requirements for sperm donation vary among sperm banks, 
common requirements include that the donor be between the ages of eighteen 
and thirty-eight, be a minimum height (usually around 5’8”), have a college 
degree or be a currently enrolled college student, not use tobacco or alcohol 
heavily, and be able to make weekly visits to the sperm bank to donate for some 
minimum period—normally around nine months.47 Studies have shown that 
most sperm donors are young, white, single, and full-time students.48 
Prospective donors must first complete a medical-history questionnaire 
covering their own histories and those of two generations of family members. 
Particular attention is paid to information that might reveal a high risk of 
communicable disease, including HIV, Hepatitis B, and other sexually 
transmitted diseases.49 
Prospective donors must also complete a physical exam and be tested for 
sexually transmitted diseases and a variety of diseases mandated by the FDA, 
including HIV and hepatitis. Comprehensive genetic testing is considered 
impractical and prohibitively expensive and, therefore, is not legally required. 
Nonetheless, many sperm banks test for the most common genetically 
transmitted diseases, such as Tay-Sachs and cystic fibrosis, and conduct 
ethnically based genetic-carrier screens.50 Finally, donors must pass a semen 
 
artificial insemination amounts to adultery as “verging on the bizarre” and discussing other religious 
objections to artificial insemination). More recently, members of the Warnock Committee (established 
by the British government to study and make recommendations on issues of human fertilization and 
embryology, and which led to the British Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990) reported 
unspecified feelings by the committee of “yuk” and “instinctive dislike” of sperm donation, which they 
recommended be approved, nonetheless. Id. at 89–90; see also infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text 
(discussing the modern social conception of sperm donation). 
 46. Denise Grady, As the Use of Donor Sperm Increases, Secrecy Can Be a Health Hazard, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 6, 2006, at F5. 
 47. See, e.g., Become a Sperm Donor, http://thespermbankofca.org/pages/page.php?pageid=11& 
cat=11 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009); Becoming a Sperm Donor, http://www.genomeresources.com/? 
page=becoming (last visited Mar. 11, 2009); How to Become a PRS Sperm Donor, https://www.pac 
repro.com/index.php?main_page=how_to_become (last visited Mar. 11, 2009); How to Become a 
Sperm Donor, http://www.spermcenter.com/formen.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
 48. See, e.g., Rachel Cook & Susan Golombok, A Survey of Semen Donation: Phase II—The View 
of the Donors, 10 HUM. REPROD. 951, 952 (1995) (studying the profiles of a sample of sperm donors 
and finding an average age of twenty-four, and that 81% were single, 89% were white, and 65% were 
full-time students); Shover et al., supra note 16, at 576 (reporting similar findings) 
 49. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION (SPERM, EGG, AND EMBRYO 
DONATION AND SURROGACY): A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 10 (2006), available at http://www.asrm.org/ 
Patients/patientbooklets/thirdparty.pdf. 
 50. Id. 
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analysis to test for sperm count and the ability of semen samples to withstand 
freezing in liquid nitrogen and subsequent thawing.51 
Like egg donors, sperm donors are asked to complete donor profiles 
detailing their hobbies, interests, and other personal information that are then 
made available to couples seeking a sperm donor. Although it is less common 
than with egg donors, given the traditional anonymity in the sperm market, 
some sperm banks may ask donors for photos or videos.52 Many sperm banks 
also allow a donor to specify whether he is willing to have his identity released 
to offspring once they turn eighteen, and may pay an extra fee to donors willing 
to agree to this condition.53 
Unlike egg donors, who do not donate until they are matched with a specific 
couple, sperm donors begin donating as soon as they have completed and 
passed the forgoing steps.54 The sperm is then frozen and quarantined for a 
federally mandated six-month period (when the donor is retested for infectious 
disease, including HIV) and is then released for purchase.55 
B. Compensation and Controversy 
Sperm donor compensation varies less than does egg donor compensation 
and has generated comparatively little controversy or discussion in the United 
States.56 The Web sites of most sperm banks report compensation levels of 
between $50 and $100 per usable sample,57 consistent with the reported national 
average of $75.58 Payment levels may increase upon the completion of stated 
goals, such as making twenty-five successful donations, and bonuses are 
typically paid for such acts as successfully referring a friend (around $750) and 
upon completion of the exit blood test six months after exiting the donor 
program.59 
 
 51. Several samples typically are required, as sperm susceptibility to damage from freezing varies 
not only among individuals, but also among samples from the same individual. Id.; Becoming a Sperm 
Donor, supra note 47. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., BioGenetics Corporation, “Become Exclusive Donor” in NJ or NY, http://www. 
sperm1.com/biogenetics/donor.html#Anchor-When-47857 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (offering $100 per 
usable specimen for anonymous donors and $500 per usable specimen to open I.D. donors); California 
Cryobank, CCB Open Donors, http://www.spermbank.com/newdonors/index.cfm?ID=19 (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2009) (offering extra payments to donors who agree to have their identity released). 
 54. AM. SOC’Y. FOR REPROD. MED, supra note 49, at 10. 
 55. Id. (discussing FDA and ASRM guidelines for sperm donation); Jennifer Egan, Wanted: A Few 
Good Sperm, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 19, 2006, at 13 (discussing the operation of sperm banks). 
 56. Some exceptions are reported. For example, the previously noted auction Web site for fashion-
model gametes begins sperm bidding at $15,000. See Ron’s Angels, supra note 31. Such competition for 
sperm—particularly based on the physical attractiveness of the donor—is considered less common in 
the sperm market than in the egg market, however. 
 57. See sources cited supra note 47. 
 58. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 39 (2006). 
 59. See sources cited supra note 47. 
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Donors are expected to donate at least once per week (although many 
donate more frequently) during the minimum program period, meaning that 
donors can earn $4000 or more during a year if their samples are consistently 
usable. Typical estimates assume that each sample donation requires one hour 
of the donor’s time, including travel to and from the center and any sign-in or 
waiting times.60 As noted above, egg donors and sperm donors thus appear to be 
compensated at roughly equal hourly rates for the time that they are actually in 
a medical setting. Time spent in a medical setting, however, is not a meaningful 
metric by which to estimate hourly egg donor wages, due to the health risks, 
pain, discomfort, and inconvenience of the egg donation process. 
C. Donor Motives 
In contrast to the heated debates surrounding egg donor compensation, 
anonymous sperm donors in the United States have always been compensated, 
largely without controversy.61 Unlike egg donors, who are presumed to donate 
reproductive material out of altruism, sperm donors are assumed to donate 
primarily, if not solely, for profit opportunity. This is reflected in sperm donor 
recruitment materials, which nearly always focus on the income potential of 
sperm donation, querying prospective donors, “Why not get paid for it?” and 
advertising that “Your sperm can earn!”62 It is also reflected in the attitudes and 
statements of sperm purchasers and sperm-bank staff, who tend to view sperm 
donors more like waged employees than the gift-giving altruists that egg donors 
are expected to be.63 
Indeed, the presumption that sperm donors are motivated by profit-seeking 
is so strong that men expressing altruistic motives are frequently viewed with 
 
 60. Seibel & Kiessling, supra note 36; Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra 
note 36, at 308. One hour may be an overly generous estimate. See Paul A. Bergh, Indecent Proposal: 
$5000 Is Not “Reasonable Compensation” For Oocyte Donors—A Reply, 71 FERTILITY & STERILITY 9 
(1999) (arguing that although “the complexity and risk faced by an egg donor can’t even begin to 
compare to the relatively easy and risk-free experience of a sperm donor[,] . . . male donors receive 
between $50 to $75 per donation and these often take no more than 5 to 10 minutes to produce”) 
(emphasis added). This estimate, however, does not include time spent during the initial interview and 
subsequent screening, which probably takes several hours. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. 
Med., supra note 36, at 308; HEALTH CANADA, FINAL REPORT: WORKSHOP ON THE 
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENDITURES FOR EGG AND SPERM DONORS 5 (2005), available at http:// 
www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/alt_formats/hpb-dgps/pdf/reprod/section12-eng.pdf (“[A]ll potential [sperm] 
donors have to visit the clinic more than once before they are accepted as donors, and visits last from 
thirty minutes to three hours.”). 
 61. Instead, sperm donation controversy has largely focused on issues relating to anonymity, 
genetic testing, eugenics, and recent sperm-industry scandals. See Krawiec, supra note 1 (discussing 
each of these controversies in greater detail); see also Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the 
Line—Or the Curtain?—for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GEND. 59 (discussing the 
implications of reproductive technology for accidental incest and calling for greater regulation). 
 62. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10. 
 63. See Almeling, supra note 23, at 325–30 (discussing the expectations of sperm bank staff and 
customers that sperm donors are simply doing a job for money, whereas egg donors are donating an 
intimate and precious gift). 
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skepticism and assumed to be deviants or egomaniacs intent on propagating the 
earth.64 Not surprisingly then, a significantly larger percentage of sperm donors 
than of egg donors report money as the primary motivation behind their 
donation decision, and neither sperm-bank staff nor consumers reject sperm 
donors on this basis or seek to coach them into listing more acceptable altruistic 
motivations.65 
IV 
COMPETITION AND COLLUSION IN THE EGG MARKET 
The forgoing sections have described the recruitment, selection, retrieval, 
and compensation practices for egg and sperm donors, and reveal several 
differences between them, which are elaborated in section VI below. This 
section, however, details the most striking difference between the egg and 
sperm markets—collusive attempts to control egg prices, a practice not seen in 
the sperm industry. The fertility industry openly employs two different 
mechanisms to depress egg prices: (1) informal attempts to control egg prices 
within particular geographic markets, and (2) formal, industry-based, national 
attempts to control the price of eggs.66 
 
 64. See, e.g., Haimes, supra note 45, at 87 (discussing the concern of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury’s Commission that sperm donors might invoke “altruistic idealism” to disguise what was 
actually “spiritual pride” in their greater virility and ability to propagate); Scoop A. Wasserstein, 
Shopping For Sperm: Nobel Prizes Wanted, HARV. CRIMSON, July 22, 2005 (quoting David Plotz, 
author of The Genius Factory, as stating that the key attraction of sperm donation to most young men is 
“making money for something you do anyway,” and that, although some men claim altruistic motives, 
many of them are really egomaniacs). 
 65. See Almeling, supra note 23, at 29 (observing that agency staff will coach or disqualify egg 
donors who do not report altruistic motivations but do not do the same for sperm donors); Shover et. 
al., supra note 16, at 576 (reporting motivations for a sample of egg and sperm donors). 
 66. In addition, California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, and Maryland all 
legislatively prohibit compensation for oocytes procured for use in stem-cell research. Elizabeth 
Gerber, California Limits Egg Donor Compensation in Privately-Funded Research, 35 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 220 (2007); Russell B. Korobkin, Recent Developments in the “Stem Cell Century”: 
Implications for Embryo Research, Egg Donor Compensation, and Stem Cell Patents 13–14 (UCLA 
Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 08-21, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1143523. The legislation has generated controversy and debate, as well as a 
severe shortage of eggs for stem-cell research. See generally Korobkin, supra, at 14 (detailing examples, 
including Harvard University, which spent over $100,000 in 2007 to recruit women willing to donate 
eggs for therapeutic-cloning research without compensation and found no volunteers); Lee Romney, 
New Battle Lines Are Drawn over Egg Donation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at A27 (detailing the 
donor-compensation debate as it relates to stem-cell research); Gerber, supra (same). None of the 
restrictions apply to eggs donated for fertility treatments, a distinction for which the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has lobbied hard. Romney, supra, at A27. ASRM and 
ACOG both opposed the California Statute (S.B. 1260). See ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HEALTH, BILL 
ANALYSIS SB 1260, S.B. 1260, 2005–2006 Sess., at 10 (Cal. 2006), available at 
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1251-1300/sb_1260_cfa_20060626_104743_asm_comm.html. 
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A. Geographic “Community Standards” 
In February 1998, the Saint Barnabas Medical Center in New Jersey set off a 
firestorm of controversy when it placed advertisements in several New York–
area publications offering potential egg donors $5000, twice the $2500 that the 
center had been paying.67 The firestorm was provoked not because Saint 
Barnabas proposed to pay egg donors for their services, which it and other 
fertility clinics had been doing for years, but because the proposed payment 
increase was made in violation of an alleged understanding among New York–
area fertility centers to pay no more than $2500 for eggs.68 The ensuing debate 
(during which many fertility doctors openly discussed the need to control egg 
prices) quickly garnered newspaper and other media attention, and generated 
arguments in major medical journals.69 
The argument between physicians at competing New York–area fertility 
centers is revealing. Doctor Mark Sauer, of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical 
Center and a prominent national figure in the field of infertility treatment,70 
stated that he “was shocked” by the decision of St. Barnabas “to double the 
compensation from the community standard of $2,500 to a startling $5,000 per 
cycle,” which would inflate the cost of egg donor compensation to over $300 per 
hour and violated an ASRM Ethics Committee directive limiting oocyte donor 
compensation to “reasonable” amounts.71 
Dr. Sauer was careful to note that he did not oppose compensation to egg 
donors and, in fact, had long advocated compensation “based upon time, effort, 
and risk of involvement.”72 The problem was thus not that Saint Barnabas was 
paying egg donors, but that it was paying them too much. Sauer’s article 
concluded with a lament that Saint Barnabas, by violating existing community 
standards regarding egg donor payments, had forced all area fertility centers to 
raise compensation levels—a cost that, unfortunately, would be passed on to 
consumers: 
Inevitably, all of us will be forced to raise our compensation rates to meet this 
challenge. Most importantly, and most unfortunately, these expenses will have to be 
passed on directly to our patients, who are already spending considerable sums of 
money to seek this procedure.73 
 
 67. Kolata, supra note 30. 
 68. Bergh, supra note 60; Mark V. Sauer, Indecent Proposal: $5000 Is Not “Reasonable 
Compensation” for Oocyte Donors, 71 FERTILITY & STERILITY 7 (1999). 
 69. See, e.g., Bergh, supra note 60, at 9; Kolata, supra note 30; Sauer, supra note 68, at 7; Mark V. 
Sauer, Letters to the Editor: The Debate Continues, 72 FERTILITY & STERILITY 182, 182–83 (1999) 
[hereinafter Sauer, The Debate Continues]; American RadioWorks: The Fertility Race (Part 10), The 
Decision to Donate—Assessing the Risks (American Public Media radio broadcast), available at http:// 
americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/fertility_race/part10/section3.shtml. 
 70. Dr. Sauer is currently a Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology and Director of the Division of 
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility at Columbia University Medical Center. See http:// 
www.cumc.columbia.edu/dept/obgyn/services/infertility/clinical_team.html. 
 71. Sauer, supra note 68, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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Dr. Sauer also wrote letters to leaders in the field, including current, past, 
and incoming presidents of ASRM and SART, as well as “directors of local 
programs in New York City.”74 He also wrote to academics in the field, 
including Dr. Alan DeCherney, editor of the medical journal, Fertility & 
Sterility, who urged Dr. Sauer to expand on his letter and submit it to the 
journal for publication.75 In the same journal issue, Dr. Paul Bergh of the Saint 
Barnabas Medical Center responded, expressing puzzlement at Dr. Sauer’s 
shock: Surely, as an esteemed fertility doctor involved in the field of oocyte 
donation, Dr. Sauer must be aware that many reputable oocyte donation 
programs across the country already paid similar rates to egg donors.76 He 
queried whether Sauer’s concern was prompted more by his own center’s 
physical proximity to Saint Barnabas than by a concern for egg donors, and 
noted that Dr. Sauer’s clinic was one of the first in the New York metropolitan 
area to match the Saint Barnabas compensation levels of $5000.77 
B. National Price-Fixing Through Professional Standards 
National attempts by the fertility industry to control egg prices are 
evidenced by the enforcement efforts and “recommendations” of ASRM and 
SART. ASRM and SART have taken the position, at least since 1994, that 
reasonable compensation to gamete donors is ethically permissible.78 It was not 
until 2000, however, in the wake of increasing controversy, within and without 
the medical community, regarding rising rates of egg donor compensation, that 
ASRM quantified the definition of “reasonable” and began formal attempts to 
cap the price of eggs at a specific amount.79 
The 2000 report of the ASRM Ethics Committee regarding financial 
incentives for egg donors stated that “[p]ayments to women providing oocytes 
should be fair and not so substantial that they become undue inducements that 
will lead donors to discount risks,” and proceeded to analogize the egg-
donation process to the sperm-donation process.80 As previously noted, a prior 
study had concluded that sperm donors earned an hourly average of $60 to $75 
in 2000.81 The same study estimated that egg donors spend fifty-six hours in a 
medical setting per donation cycle.82 If egg donors were paid the same hourly 
 
 74. Sauer, The Debate Continues, supra note 69, at 182. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Bergh, supra note 60, at 9. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Ethical Considerations of Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, 62 FERTILITY & STERILITY (SUPPLEMENT 1) 47S (1994). 
 79. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial Incentives in Recruitment of 
Oocyte Donors, 74 FERTILITY & STERILITY 216, 216 (2000). 
 80. Id. at 219. 
 81. This assumes that each donated sample consumes a full hour of the donor’s time, including 
travel and waiting times. See Bergh, supra note 60, at 9 (suggesting that this overestimates the time 
required for sperm donation). 
 82. Id. 
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rate as sperm donors, these calculations would support a payment amount of 
$3360 to $4200 per egg-donation cycle.83 According to ASRM, however, because 
egg donation involves a time commitment, risk, and discomfort not associated 
with sperm donation, egg donors may deserve higher amounts.84 The report 
concluded that “[a]lthough there is no consensus on the precise payment that 
oocyte donors should receive, at this time sums of $5000 or more require 
justification and sums above $10,000 go beyond what is appropriate.”85 
In other words, ASRM used sperm donation as a bench mark, and then 
apparently determined that the additional time, risk, and discomfort 
experienced by egg donors justified an additional maximum payment, without 
explaining where those numbers came from or why they might represent a 
reasonable compensation for the additional burdens that the committee agreed 
egg donors faced. In 2007, ASRM issued new guidelines that restated these 
same amounts and rationales.86 
Naturally, a price-fixing agreement would be fruitless in the absence of 
enforcement efforts, and the ASRM oocyte donor financial-compensation 
guidelines are no exception. SART, the primary member organization for 
assisted reproductive technology (ART) professionals in the United States, has 
a stated purpose of standard setting and maintenance in the ART industry.87 
SART-member clinics, which account for more than eighty-five percent of 
fertility clinics in the United States,88 are expected to abide by SART guidelines, 
including the ASRM Ethics Committee guidelines on oocyte donor 
compensation.89  Although recent surveys of SART-member clinics suggest 
broad compliance with the oocyte-pricing guidelines,90 these self-reported (and 
unverified) numbers must be approached with the skepticism appropriate to 
public self-declarations of compliance with industry ethical guidelines. 
As previously indicated, however, many fertility clinics procure eggs from 
independent egg donor agencies.91 Without some mechanism for ensuring their 
compliance, the SART and ASRM efforts would be ineffective. In May 2005, 
SART, with the support of two consumer organizations—RESOLVE (the 
national infertility association) and the American Fertility Association 
(AFA)—sent a letter to independent egg donor agencies informing them that 
all donor agencies serving SART-member clinics were expected to abide by the 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Ethics Committee of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 36, at 305. 
 87. See generally SART Homepage, supra note 32. 
 88. Jennifer Durgin, More Is Not Merrier in Fertility Clinics, DARTMOUTH MED., Summer 2007, at 
3, available at http://dartmed.dartmouth.edu/summer07/html/disc_fertility.php. 
 89. Covington & Gibbons, supra note 15, at 1001. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Seventy-one percent of SART-member clinics report the use of egg donors from donor-
recruitment agencies. Seventy-five percent report an in-house, paid, donor-recruitment program. Id. at 
1002. 
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ASRM egg donor compensation guidelines.92 The agencies were asked to sign a 
voluntary agreement with SART to abide by the ASRM guidelines and to 
inform the SART-member clinics with whom they worked of their agreement. 
In exchange, donor agencies that had signed the agreement would be listed on 
SART’s Web site, and their names would be forwarded to RESOLVE and 
AFA to provide information to patient–consumers seeking guidance in their 
efforts to locate donor agencies.93 In February 2006, a follow-up letter was sent 
to donor agencies reminding them that a failure to adhere to the SART–ASRM 
guidelines would result in the removal of their agencies from the list of SART-
approved donor programs.94 Many donor agencies have a vested interest in 
maintaining good relations (and a customer–patient listing) with SART by 
agreeing to abide by the guidelines, and, as of June 2008, ninety-three had 
agreed to do so.95 A recent study reviewing the fees listed on Web sites of donor 
agencies listed as SART-approved concluded that the average donor 
compensation is $5200, which (although higher than the average reported by 
SART-member clinics) is still roughly in accord with the ASRM guidelines.96 As 
is the case with the self-reported clinic egg-pricing data, these self-reported 
numbers must be approached with caution, and other data suggest potentially 
higher averages.97 
Finally, individual fertility clinics report their own policing and enforcement 
efforts of the ASRM oocyte donor compensation guidelines. For example, Dr. 
Brian Berger, medical director of the Donor Egg and Gestational Carrier 
program at the Boston IVF fertility-treatment center, reports that Boston IVF 
keeps records of egg donor agencies that exceed the ASRM compensation 
guidelines and refuses to do business with them.98 
V 
ANTITRUST 
In this section I contend that the ASRM donor-compensation guidelines and 
accompanying enforcement mechanisms discussed in  section IV are illegal 
under the Sherman Act.99 Because the application of antitrust law to the egg 
industry would be a case of first impression, I analyze the relevant law in some 
detail, demonstrating that (1) the jurisdictional requirement of interstate 
 
 92. Id. at 1001. 
 93. Id. at 1001–02. 
 94. Id. at 1002. 
 95. The list is available at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/eggdonor_agencies.pdf. 
 96. Covington & Gibbons, supra note 15, at 1003. 
 97. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (elaborating on the problems with self-reported 
egg-pricing data and discussing disconfirming evidence). 
 98. Carlene Hempel, Golden Eggs, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., June 25, 2006, at 18. 
 99. Because the evidence of an agreement is weaker with respect to the “community standards” 
discussed supra in section IV.A and because, in any event, those standards appear largely supplanted 
by the ASRM compensation guidelines, I focus the discussion in this section V on the ASRM 
guidelines. 
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commerce is met; (2) neither individual fertility centers, SART, nor ASRM is 
entitled to any special immunity from antitrust law; (3) the agreements to 
suppress the price of eggs, as naked price-fixing agreements, should be 
considered per se illegal; and (4) even under a “quick look” or rule of reason 
analysis the agreements fail—the fertility centers comprising SART have 
market power, and the agreements have no legitimate procompetitive or 
redeeming social-welfare features. 
A. Jurisdiction 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal “[e]very contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States . . . .”100 Courts have defined “trade or 
commerce” broadly, concluding that Congress intended the statute “to embrace 
the widest array of conduct possible,”101 including such disparate practices as 
plasma donation,102 the setting of financial aid for admitted students,103 and many 
other activities whose commercial nature is not immediately obvious to the 
casual observer. As stated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
“the exchange of money for services, even by a nonprofit organization, is a 
quintessential commercial transaction.” 104  The exchange of reproductive 
material for monetary compensation thus quite easily fits within prior judicial 
interpretations of “trade or commerce” under the Sherman Act. 
Moreover, as implied by the foregoing quotation, the Sherman Act applies 
not only to business enterprises, but to professional organizations, such as law 
firms and dental and medical practices; to nonprofits, such as institutions of 
higher education;105 and to associations of professionals, such as professional 
associations of lawyers, engineers, and dentists.106 Clearly then, both individual 
fertility centers (many of which are separately incorporated, for-profit 
enterprises, even when affiliated with a nonprofit hospital or university)107 and 
the professional organizations of fertility specialists, such as SART and ASRM, 
are not immune from U.S. antitrust laws. As discussed in section V.C, however, 
 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 101. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 102. Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding the trial court abused 
its discretion by dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the antitrust claims of a homeless person whose 
livelihood depended on the sale of plasma). 
 103. Brown, 5 F.3d at 667 (holding that a full rule of reason analysis was required to determine 
whether an agreement to set financial-aid packages violated the Sherman Act). 
 104. Id. at 787–88. 
 105. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984) (“There is 
no doubt that the sweeping language of § 1 applies to nonprofit entities.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (finding that the FTC had jurisdiction over 
the California Dental Association, a nonprofit, voluntary association of local dental societies to which 
19,000 dentists belonged, including roughly seventy-five percent of those practicing in the state of 
California); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787–88 (1975) (finding that a nonprofit 
professional association of lawyers violated the Sherman Act). 
 107. SPAR, supra note 58, at 49 (describing the commercial nature of fertility-center operations). 
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this does not necessarily mean that the special status of fertility centers as part 
of the medical profession and the fact that SART and ASRM are professional 
associations of such medical professionals is irrelevant to an antitrust 
assessment of the price-fixing agreement. 
B. Per Se Illegality 
Agreements among competitors (so-called “horizontal agreements”) to fix 
prices have long been considered per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 
whether agreements to fix output prices at some maximum (sellers’ cartel 
agreements) or to fix input prices at some minimum (buyers’ cartel 
agreements).108 As stated by one commentator, “no serious argument can be 
made that antitrust law should make distinctions between buyer power and 
seller power if significant market power is obtained anti-competitively, such as 
through horizontal combination or collusion,” and, overall, courts have treated 
the two situations similarly.109 
Classifying an agreement as a per se violation dispenses with the need to 
inquire into market structure, the market power of the violators, or the 
anticompetitive effects of the behavior.110 Under a per se analysis, therefore, the 
attempts by fertility professionals and their member organizations to suppress 
the market price for eggs would be conclusively presumed illegal, as were the 
agreements among competing physicians to set maximum fees to be submitted 
to insurers,111 and the promulgation and enforcement by the Virginia State and 
Fairfax County bar associations of minimum-fee schedules for lawyers.112 
C. Rule of Reason Analysis 
However, courts have sometimes analyzed alleged anticompetitive behavior 
by nonprofit or professional associations under a rule of reason or “quick look” 
analysis,113 when the same conduct would be considered per se illegal if carried 
 
 108. Per se agreements are “agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly 
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality—they are 
‘illegal per se.’” Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). Naked price-
fixing is one of the few fact patterns easily characterized as a per se violation of the Sherman Act 
because “naked price fixing rarely or never has anything to be said in its support.” HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 256 (3d ed. 2005). 
 109. Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 591 (2004); see 
also ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 26 
(1993) (“[B]uyers have given in to the temptation to fix prices and have, for the most part, been treated 
in the same manner as sellers.”); HOVENKAMP, supra note 108, at 17 (“[M]onopsony is an important 
antitrust concern and is just as inconsistent with consumer welfare as monopoly is.”). 
 110. HOVENKAMP, supra note 108, at 257. As stated by the Supreme Court, “[T]he absence of proof 
of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output.” NCAA, 68 U.S. at 109. 
 111. See Arizona. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342–57 (1982) (holding that 
maximum-fee agreements for physician services are per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 112. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 113. Under a rule of reason analysis, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating “adverse, 
anti-competitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets,” which is typically 
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out by business organizations.114 Moreover, some antitrust scholars analyzing the 
health-care field have lamented the extent to which modern courts appear 
overly deferential to the health-care industry in antitrust challenges, 
demonstrating a particular willingness to tolerate potential anticompetitive 
outcomes when the actors in question are nonprofits.115 
Such judicial deference is not explicitly a product of the organizational form 
or nonprofit status of the defendants, but rather of a perception that, in many 
such cases, the anticompetitive effects of the agreement or the intentions of the 
alleged violators are not immediately discernable. As elaborated by the Third 
Circuit in United States v. Brown University, the Supreme Court “has been more 
hesitant to condemn agreements by professional associations as unreasonable 
per se, or to apply a per se rejection to competitive restraints imposed in 
contexts where the economic impact of such practices is neither one with which 
the Court has dealt previously, nor immediately apparent.”116 
In Brown, for example, the court held that full rule of reason analysis must 
be employed to determine the legality of the agreement among MIT and eight 
Ivy League colleges to collectively determine the amount of financial aid that 
would be awarded to needy students admitted to all nine schools.117 Because the 
agreement was plainly anticompetitive on its face, MIT (the sole remaining 
defendant at trial) was required to provide some competitive justification, even 
in the absence of a detailed market analysis.118 MIT met this burden by claiming 
that the agreement improved the quality of the product (education), by 
promoting socioeconomic diversity, and enhanced consumer choice by making 
an education affordable for a larger number of people.119 
The Court also rejected a per se analysis in NCAA v. Board of Regents of 
the University of Oklahoma,120 carefully noting that its decision was not driven 
by the NCAA’s status as a nonprofit entity or by its traditional role in the 
 
accomplished through proof of the defendant’s market power. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 
658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993). “Quick look” analysis is an intermediate standard that the Court has applied 
“in cases where per se condemnation is inappropriate, but where ‘no elaborate industry analysis is 
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character’ of an inherently suspect restraint.” Id. at 669 
(quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109). Under a quick-look analysis “the defendant must promulgate some 
competitive justification for the restraint, even in the absence of detailed market analysis.” Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17 (1975) (condemning the practice at issue—a minimum-
fee schedule published by the Fairfax County Bar Association—but noting the special character of the 
learned professions); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 682–83 (1978) 
(invalidating under an abbreviated rule of reason, rather than a per se, analysis an ethics rule 
promulgated by a nonprofit professional association of engineers that prohibited competitive bidding 
for jobs). 
 115. See generally Richman, supra note 5. 
 116. See Brown, 5 F.3d at 671; Richman, supra note 5, at 124 (arguing that courts’ hands-off 
approach to nonprofit-hospital mergers reflects a misunderstanding of the ways in which the structure 
of the American health-care system affects market competition). 
 117. Brown, 5 F.3d at 660. 
 118. Id. at 673. 
 119. Id. at 674–75. 
 120. 68 U.S. 85 (1984).  
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preservation of amateurism in athletics (a fact influential to Justice White’s 
dissenting opinion), but rather on the fact that the case involved “an industry in 
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
available at all.”121 The Court, nonetheless, held that the agreements limiting 
NCAA members’ ability to televise intercollegiate football games violated the 
Sherman Act, because of their anticompetitive effect on price and output.122 
Finally, in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 123  the Court held that the 
California Dental Association’s restrictions on advertising “might plausibly be 
thought to have a net procompetitive effect or no effect at all on competition,” 
as the agreements were “at least on their face, designed to avoid false or 
deceptive advertising.”124 The Court thus rejected a per se analysis of the 
advertising restrictions and remanded the case for further analysis.125 
In contrast, as discussed in more detail below, the negative economic 
impacts of the agreement among fertility professionals to suppress egg prices 
are readily apparent, and there are no arguable procompetitive benefits. 
Accordingly, this is not the type of arrangement deserving of courts’ more-
detailed rule of reason analysis such as that afforded MIT in Brown or the 
NCAA in NCAA v. University of Oklahoma. Nonetheless, as demonstrated in 
section V.D, the egg-pricing agreements fail even under a detailed rule of 
reason analysis. 
Finally, defendants (particularly nonprofit and professional-association 
defendants) sometimes attempt social-welfare justifications for their 
anticompetitive conduct. Typically, courts reject these justifications as irrelevant 
to the question of whether the alleged conduct is anticompetitive. 
To illustrate, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,126 
the society defended a canon prohibiting its members from competitively 
bidding for jobs, invoking a public-policy rationale that competitive bidding 
would induce engineers to cut corners in order to generate the lowest bid, thus 
undermining consumer safety. The Supreme Court rejected the defense, noting, 
“the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that 
competition itself is unreasonable.”127 The Court applied similar reasoning to 
invalidate a dental-association rule forbidding the submission of X-rays to 
dental insurers.128 
 
 121. Id. at 106–07. 
 122. Id. 
 123. 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 124. Id. at 771. 
 125. Id. 
 126. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 127. Id. at 691 (1978); NCAA, 68 U.S. at 116 (rejecting the NCAA’s defense, and stating that, “at 
bottom the NCAA’s position is that ticket sales for most college games are unable to compete in a free 
market”). 
 128. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986) (rejecting the argument that “an 
unrestrained market in which consumers are given access to the information they believe to be relevant 
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In Brown, in contrast, the Third Circuit held that the district court erred in 
failing to consider MIT’s social-welfare justification—equality of educational 
access—a goal that Congress had repeatedly sought to promote.129 Although 
Brown is considered a deviant case in its embrace of social-policy defenses to 
collusive behavior, it is always possible that markets in reproductive material 
will generate similarly aberrant judicial analyses, making an understanding of 
the social-welfare impact of the ASRM–SART price-fixing agreement 
important. In the following subsection, therefore, I argue that even in the 
unlikely event that social-welfare justifications were considered relevant to an 
antitrust analysis of the horizontal egg-price-fixing agreement, those 
justifications are implausible on their face. 
D. Application to Egg-Pricing Agreements 
As previously noted, the ASRM–SART agreement to fix the purchase price 
of eggs should be considered per se illegal. The horizontal agreement is naked, 
and the context is not one (like that confronted by the Brown or California 
Dentist courts) in which the agreement plausibly serves some other 
procompetitive purpose. Yet the agreements fail even under a rule of reason 
analysis. 
First, the fertility-industry collaborators have market power. Eighty-five 
percent of fertility centers in the United States are SART members and, 
because the largest, most prestigious centers tend to join SART, the market 
share of SART-member clinics is likely even greater.130 This is significantly more 
market share than the California Dental Association, which claimed seventy-
five percent of the dentists in California as members,131  and the Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, which had a smaller (though highly concentrated) 
market share.132 
Moreover, the fertility industry presents barriers to entry, including the costs 
of a medical education and setting up a practice, as well as licensing and other 
requirements.133 In addition, SART members believe that membership in the 
organization is important and is valued by consumers of fertility services, all of 
which contribute to market power.134 
Second, the type of agreement here—a horizontal agreement to fix the 
purchase price of eggs—plainly presents the same danger of anticompetitive 
 
to their choices will lead them to make unwise and even dangerous choices” as “‘nothing less than a 
frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act’”). 
 129. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 675 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 130. Durgin, supra note 88, at 3. 
 131. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 787 (1999). 
 132. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 451. 
 133. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 788 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting 
that the field of dentistry presents barriers to entry, including the costs of education and setting up a 
practice). 
 134. See id. at 789 (making this argument in connection with the California Dental Association as 
evidence of market power). 
04_KRAWIEC_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009 1:21:36 PM 
82 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:59 
effects present in any other collusive buyers’ agreement: reduced supply, 
diminished consumer choice, and a wealth transfer from suppliers that is not 
passed on to consumers. Infertile couples pay large sums to fertility clinics for 
the bundle of goods and services (including the egg) that will result in the 
creation of an embryo for implantation. Although the demand for fertility 
services may be less elastic with respect to price than is the case with some other 
markets, there is no evidence that demand is completely price insensitive—
consumers seem to care about price and to purchase fewer services when prices 
rise.135 
For this reason, fertility clinics have an incentive to contain the price of eggs 
in order to enjoy the surplus created by the ability to purchase their inputs at 
below-market prices. Of course, capping input prices reduces the available 
supply for both fertility centers and consumers. As in the traditional oligopsony 
model, however, fertility centers accept reduced access to inputs in exchange for 
a lower purchase price.136 In other words, assuming that the marginal cost of any 
unit of a good is the price paid on all prior units, an oligopsonist will fail to 
purchase some units whose value to the oligopsonist exceeds their costs in order 
to cap the purchase price of prior units.137 As a consequence, oligopsony power 
(like oligopoly power) produces inefficient supply levels.138 The end result is 
product scarcity: consumers of fertility services are deprived of the full range 
and number of eggs that would be available to them in a free market. 
Confusion regarding the effects of monopsony markets on consumer prices 
has sometimes led courts and policymakers to conclude that monopsony is not a 
concern of antitrust law, which seeks a goal of low consumer prices.139 This 
analysis, however, incorrectly assumes that the savings from low input prices in 
a monopsony market will be passed on to consumers. Instead, a monopsonist 
who sells into a competitive market will charge consumers the same price as a 
 
 135. See SPAR, supra note 58, at 32 (discussing the elasticity of demand in the baby market); 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Price and Pretense in the Baby Market, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY, MORALS, 
AND THE NEOPOLITICS OF CHOICE (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=13427 
10 (discussing characteristics, including demand elasticity, of various baby-market sectors). 
 136. The phrase “monopsony,” meaning a single buyer, was first coined by Joan Robinson. JOAN 
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 215 (1933). Given that single-buyer 
models are typically unrealistic as applied to modern markets, economists instead employ models of 
oligopsony or “competitive monopsony,” in which buyer market power persists despite competition 
among buyers. The phrase “oligopsony” refers to the market power of buyers and not their number, 
which need not be small. V. Bhaskar et. al., Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor 
Markets, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 155, 156 (2002). 
 137. William Boal & Michael Ransom, Monopsony in American Labor Markets, EH.Net 
Encyclopedia (Jan. 23, 2002), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/boal.monopsony. 
 138. HOVENKAMP, supra note 108, at 256; Boal & Ransom, supra note 137. 
 139. See, e.g., Balmoral Cinema v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 316 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(suggesting that the exercise of buyer market power increases consumer welfare through lower 
consumer prices); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
471 U.S. 1029 (1985) (holding that Blue Shield’s prohibition against doctors’ charging Blue Shield 
subscribers more than the stipulated payment-schedule amounts did not violate the Sherman Act, 
because Blue Shield would pass on the benefits of reduced insurance premiums to its customers). 
04_KRAWIEC_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009 1:21:36 PM 
Summer 2009] SUNNY SAMARITANS AND EGOMANIACS 83 
nonmonopsonist, but will supply a lower amount of the good.140 In contrast, a 
monopsonist buyer who also enjoys monopoly (or cartel) power over 
consumers will sell to consumers at a higher price than a nonmonopsonist.141 
Monopsony markets, therefore, do not benefit consumers and create a 
deadweight efficiency loss (as do monopoly markets) because some market 
actors engage in a second-choice transaction that produces less social value than 
their first choice.142 Consequently, today it is well established that horizontal 
purchase agreements present just as much anticompetitive danger as do 
horizontal selling agreements.143 
Third, there are no plausible procompetitive benefits to the egg-pricing 
agreement that could not be achieved through less-draconian measures. Indeed, 
it is telling that neither individual fertility-industry collaborators nor ASRM 
even raise procompetitive justifications for the agreements, relying instead on 
social-welfare justifications. This is because, unlike those rare cases in which 
courts have allowed naked collusion on price or output, collusion on egg prices 
does not enable an otherwise nonexistent market to operate or enhance the 
quality or diversity of consumer choice.144 Indeed the ASRM–SART agreement 
has exactly the opposite effect: consumers are deprived of both quantity and 
choice. 
Fourth, and finally, in rare cases (such as Brown), courts have considered 
social welfare or other noneconomic justifications for anticompetitive behavior. 
It is important to note that even the Brown court—notable for its unusual 
embrace of social-policy justifications—insisted that social policy alone was an 
insufficient justification for anticompetitive behavior.145 
It is unlikely, therefore, that a court would entertain social policy 
justifications for the SART–ASRM price-fixing agreements, and even less likely 
that a court would find them persuasive in the absence of compelling 
 
 140. This is because, although the monopsonist can purchase the input at lower prices, its marginal 
outlay (the total additional cost of producing one more unit) is higher than a buyer in a competitive 
market. Unless the monopsonist can perfectly price discriminate, each additional unit she purchases 
increases the price of all previously purchased units. This is in contrast to the buyer in a competitive 
market, who must pay the market wage regardless of how many inputs she purchases. For more 
extensive discussion of this point, see BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 109; HOVENKAMP, supra note 
108, at 14–16, 158–59; Noll, supra note 109, at 591. 
 141. HOVENKAMP, supra note 108, at 14–15. 
 142. Id. at 19–20. A difficulty with antitrust analyses of monopsony markets, however, is 
distinguishing low input purchase prices stemming from monopsony from those stemming from 
reduced transaction costs or the elimination of upstream market power. Id. at 16. 
 143. See sources cited supra note 109. 
 144. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117–19 (1984) (holding 
that the special nature of athletic competition requires some cooperation); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 
441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) (finding that the collusion at issue enabled the creation of a product package that 
no individual could offer, thus enhancing consumer choice and increasing the volume of music sales); 
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 682–84 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that collusion improved the 
product itself because socioeconomic diversity enhances the educational experience). 
 145. Brown, 5 F.3d at 669 (“[A] restraint on competition cannot be justified solely on the basis of 
social welfare concerns.”). 
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procompetitive justifications. Even in the unlikely event that a court was willing 
to entertain social-welfare arguments in support of price restraints in the oocyte 
market, however, such justifications should not carry the day. Unlike Brown—
in which MIT could point to a social policy (equality of educational access) that 
Congress had supported for many years and that was arguably furthered by its 
agreements with the Ivy League colleges to set financial aid compensation—
Congress has not ever, much less repeatedly, evinced a desire to exert controls 
on compensation to either sperm or egg donors. 
Furthermore, it is implausible that social welfare concerns, rather than profit 
opportunity (or, as elaborated below, political maneuvering), 146  primarily 
motivate the price-fixing agreements in question, because the agreements do 
not have the effect of promoting the purported noneconomic justifications. 
Fertility professionals have long proffered two social-welfare justifications for 
the need to control oocyte prices: that high egg prices commodify reproductive 
labor and that egg donors may be coerced by the hope of large financial 
compensation into taking risks that they otherwise would not.147 Elsewhere, I 
critique each of these arguments in more detail. 148  For present purposes, 
however, it is sufficient to note that, if true, these objections would support a 
ban on payments to egg donors—not a cap on them. Therefore, fertility 
professionals truly concerned with the ethical dangers of either 
commodification or coercion would simply refuse to pay egg donors or to 
employ purchased eggs in connection with any fertility services they provide. 
First, even assuming that commodification objections have some traction in 
the context of egg markets, and even assuming that it is possible to structure 
financial incentives to egg donors in a manner that alleviates those objections 
while compensating donors for the time, effort, and health risks associated with 
the procedure,149 there is no evidence that the ASRM price caps appropriately 
strike that balance. In fact, there is no indication that ASRM even considered 
such factors when setting standards for permissible egg donor compensation. As 
 
 146. See infra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that the oocyte-pricing 
agreement primarily serves the political purpose of avoiding more onerous state or federal regulation 
of the fertility industry). 
 147. See Am. Soc’y. for Reprod. Med., supra note 49, at 10 (outlining justifications for the ASRM 
oocyte-pricing guidelines). 
 148. See generally Krawiec, supra note 1 (critiquing each of these arguments in more detail); 
Korobkin, supra note 66 (addressing coercion, commodification, and other objections to compensated 
egg donation for stem-cell research). 
 149. These contestable assumptions are frequently invoked in debates over the propriety of 
financial incentives for gametes, organs and other tissue, blood, plasma, and human-subjects research. 
See generally Rosario M. Isasi & Bartha M. Knoppers, Monetary Payments for the Procurement of 
Oocytes for Stem Cell Research: In Search of Ethical and Political Consistency, 1 STEM CELL RES. 37 
(2007) (discussing compensation mechanisms that the authors conclude have the capacity to preserve 
the principles of altruism and community solidarity, while increasing participation through financial 
incentives); Julia D. Mahoney, Altruism, Markets, and Organ Procurement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 17 (Summer 2009) (discussing a variety of proposed or possible compensation schemes for 
organ donation, some of which represent a middle ground between market-based compensation and 
pure altruism). 
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previously discussed, the benchmark against which ASRM determined 
appropriate egg donor compensation levels was the existing, market-
determined, sperm donor compensation rate.150 
Second, the ability of any sum to coerce or commodify is a direct function of 
that person’s financial need. Accordingly, egg donor compensation caps, 
without reference to the potential donor’s financial needs, do nothing to 
address the financial coercion and commodification objections. To illustrate, 
take the hypothetical example of token payments to plasma donors. Suppose 
that a group of plasma collection centers determines that paying for plasma is 
problematic, but that compensation in token amounts of twenty-five dollars to 
cover gas expenditures or inconvenience is permissible. The twenty-five-dollar 
sum is negligible to many professionals and likely to play little or no role in 
their decisionmaking or the extent to which they perceive their bodies to have 
been commodified. Yet the sums are not irrelevant to many poor individuals 
and, in fact, constitute the only source of income for some homeless persons. 
For this reason, the only court to consider the case has recognized that, 
assuming the homeless plaintiff can prove the existence of a collusive 
agreement, the plasma collection centers have violated the Sherman Act.151 
A similar argument was recently raised by Mark D. Fox in connection with 
the debate over financial incentives for organ donation, albeit to argue against 
such monetary incentives. In response to a proposal by Gaston, Danovitch, 
Epstein, Kahn, Matas, and Schnitzler to increase live organ donation rates 
through a package of financial incentives that includes insurance, 
reimbursement of lost wages and direct expenses, and a fixed payment for pain 
and suffering,152 Fox contended that,  
[w]hile the proposed benefit may not be a deciding factor to the CEO of a Fortune 500 
company, to someone earning only minimum wage, the compensation may represent 
several months’ pay. To deny the potential of this proposal to ‘coerce an otherwise 
unwarranted decision to donate’ reflects the folly of the privileged, not the reality of 
the poor.153 
Ironically, the most likely effect of the ASRM price cap is to drive from the 
market the most highly desired egg donors, who tend to be better-educated and 
of a higher socioeconomic status.154 These donors are arguably in a better 
position to evaluate the risks of egg donation against the monetary benefits and 
should be less susceptible to the “coercive” effects of monetary compensation, 
 
 150. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales and mechanisms by 
which ASRM developed pricing guidelines for oocyte donation). 
 151. See Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 152. Robert S. Gaston et. al., Limiting Financial Disincentives in Live Organ Donation: A Rational 
Solution to the Kidney Shortage, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2548–55 (2006). 
 153. Mark D. Fox, The Price is Wrong: The Moral Cost of Living Donor Inducements, 6 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 2529–30 (2006). 
 154. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Human and Economic Dimensions of Altruism: The Case of Organ 
Transplantation, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 483 (2008) (arguing that, because organ recipients care deeply 
about quality, demand is low under a market-based procurement system for organs from those who are 
“down and out”). 
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because they are more likely to have other income opportunities to choose 
from. 
Therefore, if either commodification or coercion concerns were truly the 
motivating force behind the fertility industry’s efforts to control egg prices, 
those controls would take the form of bans on egg donor compensation 
resembling those in other countries, rather than a cap. A ban on payment, of 
course, would severely reduce the supply of donated eggs, a necessary 
component of many of the fertility treatments offered by fertility centers, thus 
reducing fertility professionals’ profits. 
Other potential defenses of caps on payments to egg donors, which are 
understandably not raised by the fertility industry (since, if valid, they would 
render current egg donor compensation practices illegal) but sometimes emerge 
in egg market debates, best fit under the rubric of what Alvin Roth has termed 
“slippery slope” objections.155 I address these concerns only briefly here, both 
because they are irrelevant to an antitrust analysis and because—like the 
coercion and commodification objections—these slippery-slope objections, if 
true, would justify a ban on egg sales, not a collusive cap on egg prices. 
First, some of the discomfort with a pure market approach to egg donor 
compensation seems to stem from perceptions that egg markets tread 
dangerously close to baby markets in ways that sperm markets do not, and that 
women are more attached to their reproductive material and their possible 
future children than are men. It seems unnecessary at first blush to even 
mention that, as a biological matter, egg and sperm markets should have an 
equal capacity to engender (or not) fears of baby markets run amok. Yet 
gendered stereotypes of women as caring mothers, emotionally attached to both 
their reproductive material and to their possible future children, and men as 
distant fathers with no emotional attachment to either their reproductive 
material or the anonymous children potentially born from it, are longstanding. 
These stereotypes have the capacity to affect the construction of reproductive 
markets in important ways, including potential emotive reactions to egg sales 
that simply are not evoked by sperm sales. For example, some egg-market 
critics exhibit a near-obsessive concern that young women, but not young men, 
will later regret their decisions to genetically parent children that they do not 
raise.156 This variant on the coercion objection frequently emerges in debates 
 
 155. See Roth, supra note 11, at 47 (arguing that much of the repugnance to cadaveric organ sales 
stems from a fear that it will lead to living-donor sales). 
 156. See Rene Almeling, Gender and the Value of Bodily Goods: Commodification in Egg and 
Sperm Donation, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (Summer 2009) (reporting that, of the agencies she 
studied, egg agencies required psychological counseling to explore donors’ psychological readiness to 
produce unknown genetic offspring, but that sperm agencies did not); Carlene Hempel, Golden Eggs, 
supra note 98, at 18 (worrying that young women will later regret the decision to produce genetic 
offspring that they do not raise, particularly if they decide to do so for money). See generally GAY 
BECKER, THE ELUSIVE EMBRYO: HOW MEN AND WOMEN APPROACH NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES (2000) (demonstrating the ways in which new reproductive technologies reflect 
gendered cultural meanings of parenthood and infertility). 
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over egg donor compensation, yet is rarely, if ever, raised in connection with 
sperm markets. 
Second, some egg-market critics seem motivated at least in part by a fear 
that unrestrained egg markets will inevitably lead to unrestrained organ 
markets. The relationship between egg and organ donation is a complex one, 
particularly given the regenerative ability of liver tissue. Currently, no federal 
law directly governs egg or sperm donation. The National Organ 
Transplantation Act (NOTA) “makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly 
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable 
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate 
commerce.”157 The statutory term “organ,” however, has not been extended to 
include sperm, ova, or embryos.158 
Unlike renewable tissue, such as sperm and plasma, for which compensation 
has long been accepted, eggs are a technically nonrenewable but realistically 
unlimited tissue.159 This distinction may lead some observers to equate egg 
markets to organ markets, rather than to sperm, blood, and plasma markets. 
The process by which egg extraction occurs—outpatient surgery—is also 
different and more invasive than the process by which sperm donation occurs. 
This alone, however, should not—and under current law, does not—dictate 
whether eggs are more like organs than like sperm. 
VI 
CONCLUSION AND CONTRASTS 
Economics and biology play an important role in the market structure of the 
gamete industry and in the different approaches to compensation and 
competition observed in egg and sperm markets. As to economics, some 
features of the sperm industry, as compared to the egg industry, would suggest a 
comparative difficulty in fixing prices, whereas others indicate the opposite. For 
example, the egg market is characterized by similar hourly wages, but higher 
per-unit prices, than the sperm market. To the extent that price-fixing entails 
enforcement, opportunity, or other costs, it may be worthwhile to incur such 
 
 157. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006). Louisiana specifically prohibits paid egg donation, whereas Virginia 
specifically permits it. Other states’ laws are silent on the matter. THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON 
BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 
174 (2004) 
 158. Perhaps to minimize the risk of noncompliance with NOTA, the ASRM Ethics Committee 
Report regarding financial incentives for egg donation specifies that compensation arrangements 
should suggest that payment is for the donor’s time and inconvenience alone, is not payment for the 
eggs themselves, and should not be so large as to be an “undue inducement” into the procedure. Am. 
Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 79, at 216; see also John Robertson, Legal Issues in Human Egg 
Donation and Gestational Surrogacy, 13 SEMINARS REPROD. ENDOCRINOLOGY 210, 213–15 (1995) 
(suggesting these restrictions as a means to address legal uncertainty regarding the status of egg and 
sperm payments under organ transplant laws.) 
 159. See Baum, supra note 14, at 127 (noting that the average woman has over 400,000 pre-oocytes 
at puberty, yet will menstruate only about 500 times in her life, meaning that under normal conditions 
no woman will ever use up all her eggs, even if many are donated to others). 
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costs in the egg industry, but not in the sperm industry.160 Moreover, due to the 
ease of freezing and shipping sperm, the U.S. sperm industry faces more 
international competition than the domestic egg market.161 Each of these factors 
would suggest a greater difficulty in profitably fixing sperm prices than in fixing 
egg prices. 
At the same time, however, the costs of sperm storage and testing are 
substantial, resulting in economies of scale.162 As a result, the sperm business has 
tended to be dominated by a small number of large, highly efficient producers, 
increasing the ease and reducing the costs associated with industry collusion.163 
Regarding biology, the more limited ability of eggs to withstand freezing 
and the need to synchronize the reproductive cycles of egg donor and intended 
mother, among other factors, dictate different matching and collection 
procedures in the sperm and egg markets that result in an impersonal, “mass 
production” model in the sperm market, and a more individuated, almost 
intimate, approach in the egg market. It is possible that this egg-market model 
lends itself, in a way that the sperm-market model does not, to gift-giving 
rhetoric and reinforces a pretense that the relationship between egg purchasers 
and egg donors is a personal one, largely motivated by a desire to help those 
suffering from infertility, rather than a commercial transaction motivated by a 
desire for profit.164 
Given that cartels are notoriously difficult to police and sustain, it is worth 
re-emphasizing in closing the limited empirical data on egg market pricing. 
Although the available evidence suggests some price suppression, existing price 
data is largely self-reported, or based on price information gathered from Web 
sites, newspapers, and other venues. The bulk of these advertisements make 
 
 160. In general, if the organization, management, and litigation costs of operating a cartel are 
greater on a per-unit basis than the amount of price suppression, then collusion will not be worthwhile. 
Significantly, for this computation, it is the absolute price and not the price per hour that is relevant. 
Thus, if sperm goes for $75 per transaction and eggs for $5000, then organizing a sperm cartel may not 
be worth its costs, even if the result were to drive sperm prices to zero. 
 161. Whereas sperm can be frozen and shipped overseas, those employing the services of an egg 
donor residing in a different geographic region either travel to the donor’s location for the fertility 
procedure or pay the expenses for the donor’s travel to the purchaser’s geographic location, 
substantially increasing the costs of the egg trade across geographic regions. Krawiec, supra note 1, at 
14–21 (discussing the international egg and sperm trades). With the exception of Denmark, which is a 
large exporter of sperm to other countries, the direction of export in the case of both egg and sperm is 
more commonly from the United States to other countries, due to shortages caused by legal restrictions 
in many other jurisdictions. Id. 
 162. SPAR, supra note 58, at 37–38. 
 163. Id. at 38. 
 164. As discussed supra notes 19–37 and accompanying text, in contrast to sperm donation, in which 
sperm donor samples are collected and the donor is paid prior to placing samples on the market, egg 
donation does not occur unless a donor is selected by a particular purchaser and a price is agreed upon. 
As a result, egg purchases seem in many ways more personal than sperm purchases. See also Almeling, 
supra note 23, at 333 (arguing that these different collection procedures lend themselves to “a caring 
gift cycle,” rather than to a “legalistic economic transaction,” and that egg donor agencies reinforce that 
perception by expressing appreciation to egg donors for their generosity in ways that are not done with 
sperm donors, who are perceived more like waged labor.) 
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clear that the offered price is merely a starting point for negotiation, a fact 
confirmed by direct observation of the donor payment process.165 
It is thus an open question whether motives beyond price suppression lie at 
the heart of fertility industry collusion in the egg market. The fertility industry 
is currently governed largely by professional self-regulation, a fact increasingly 
questioned by fertility market critics. 166  Industry controversy, including 
controversy related to egg donor compensation, threatens to displace this self-
regulatory regime with more coercive state or federal regulation. It is possible 
that industry attempts to control egg donor compensation are prompted, at 
least in part, by a desire to provide the appearance that the industry is 
addressing issues of public concern and controversy, forestalling the need for 
state intervention. 
If true, however, this political-motivation narrative is much more disturbing 
than the price-fixing narrative and reinforces a central tenet of this article: 
deeply held communal norms prompt very different societal reactions to the 
prospect of payment for egg and sperm. Indeed, the political-motivation 
narrative implies that the prospect of allowing the same market forces that 
determine the price of male reproductive tissue to set the price of female 
reproductive tissue is so troubling that the instinctual response would be to 
tighten government control of the entire industry. 
Economic sociologists, 167  cognitive theorists, 168  and (more recently) 
economists,169 have begun to turn their attention to the social and psychological 
factors that affect both market structure and the acceptable means of exchange 
within the context of certain transactions. These insights may have important 
implications for gamete markets, which traditionally have caused some level of 
cognitive, social, and legal discomfort. 
Sperm donation, historically associated with deviant behavior, continues to 
evoke a lingering skepticism regarding donor motives. Monetary payment may 
have the capacity to normalize these transactions, providing an acceptable 
donor motive unrelated to sexual impulses or egoistic desires to spread male 
 
 165. See sources cited supra notes 31, 39–40; Almeling, supra note 23, at 332–33 (discussing fee 
negotiation, and gifts and “bonuses” paid to successful egg donors). There are also allegations that 
some egg donor ads offering very large sums are not legitimate, but instead are “bait and switch” tactics 
designed to lure prospective donors into the pool. ADVISORY GROUP ON ASSISTED REPROD. TECHS., 
supra note 19, at 7 (warning prospective egg donors that, “in some cases, there is actually no couple 
willing to pay the enticing fees. Instead, a broker is trying to attract a large number of applicants.”) 
 166. Adam Pertman & Naomi Cahn, Limiting Reproduction, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 25, 2009 (citing 
recent fertility industry controversies and arguing that it is time to consider federal and state regulation 
of the fertility industry, rather than relying solely on self-regulation); Melissa Jacoby, The Debt 
Financing of Parenthood, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Summer 2009) (citing researchers that call 
for increased regulation of the fertility industry). 
 167. See, e.g., VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 27–34 (2005) (discussing the 
means by which different rules of exchange may be employed to differentiate similar relationships). 
 168. See, e.g., Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 11, at 285–94. 
 169. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 154; Roth, supra note 11. 
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genes. Sperm donation thus becomes a job like any other, mapping onto more 
comfortable stereotypes of male interests in financial gain. 
The willingness of women to procreate solely for monetary gain, however, 
causes discomfort of a different sort. As is the case with commercial surrogates, 
egg donors are reframed as loving altruists, generously giving “the gift of life” 
to help others less fortunate. Absent a severe shift in societal conceptions of 
motherhood and the propriety of female reproductive labor, appeals to 
altruistic impulses are thus likely to continue to play an important role in both 
the recruitment and marketing of egg donors. Market forces, however, and not 
industry collusion, must be allowed to determine the ultimate mix of altruism 
and monetary gain that constitutes total egg donor payment. 
